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ILLEGAL GRATUITIES
IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
LEARNING LESSONS FROM THE
SUN-DIAMOND CASE
The very essence of a free government consists in consid-
ering offices as public trusts, bestowed for the good of the
country, and not for the benefit of an individual or a party.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Bribes and illegal gratuities have been pervasive features of po-
litical systems around the world since antiquity. Indeed, religious
texts, classical literature and philosophy, and popular culture are re-
plete with tales of pocket-stuffing, gift-giving, extortion, blackmail,
and other acts of corruption. 2 The mere idea of bribery in American
society evokes vivid images of villainous gangsters lining the pock-
ets of fat-cat politicians with wads of cash in smoke-filled back-
rooms.
Bribery is defined as "an inducement improperly influencing the
performance of a public function meant to be gratuitously exer-
cised.' 3 Yet bribery is a far more complicated phenomenon than this
definition conveys. Bribes themselves can take on many shapes and
forms.4 At once, bribery is a political, legal, religious, ethical, and
social issue.5 To form an opinion about bribery is to reflect upon
1. John C. Calhoun, Speech (Feb. 13, 1885), in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 393 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
2. For a comprehensive historical and ethical discussion of bribery, see
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRiBEs (1984).
3. Id. at xi.
4. The most common bribe is cash, but bribes can also include sexual fa-
vors, commodities, and appointments. See id. at xxi.
5. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, For God, for Country, or for Me?, 74
CAL. L. REv. 1479, 1510 (1986) (book review) [hereinafter Lowenstein, Re-
view].
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one's entire conception of the political process. What may constitute
a bribe in one country or state may be a totally acceptable exchange
of favors elsewhere. In a tale from ancient Mesopotamia entitled
"The Poor Man of Nippur," for instance, the story does not condemn
a poor man who seeks to improve his lot in life by offering a goat to
the mayor, but rather condemns the mayor for not keeping his end of
the implied bargain. 6 While bribery of this type is not as common as
it once was, bribery of various other forms persists on a wide scale
today, and continues to intrigue social scientists and political aca-
demics.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze illegal gratuities in mod-
em American politics-especially the illegal gratuities statute, 18
U.S.C. § 201-in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, United
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers.7 This Note will demonstrate that
while a direct nexus between a gift and an official act may not be
necessary to convict the giver or receiver of an illegal gratuity, a gift
nonetheless will influence the public official in the official's duties,
thereby tainting the legislative process. Part II examines the scope of
illegal gratuities law prior to Sun-Diamond. Part Ill focuses on the
Sun-Diamond case itself, while Part IV analyzes the consequences of
the Supreme Court's opinion on illegal gratuities law. Finally, Part
V suggests ways of improving the illegal gratuities laws to cover
harmful gift-giving without sacrificing everyday interaction between
public officials and the corporations and individuals they represent.
II. BRIBES AND ILLEGAL GRATUITIES BEFORE SUN-DIAMOND
To gain a better understanding of the concept of bribery and to
learn how to remedy its negative effects, one must consider what
makes the exchange of gifts and favors to and from public officials
so morally reprehensible.
A. Why We Find Bribery Morally Reprehensible
At first glance, bribery is not as unethical as it seems. After all,
"[b]ribes are [merely] a species of reciprocity," 8 based on the theory
6. See id. at 1480-81 (reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 4 (1984)).
7. 119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999).
8. NOONAN, supra note 2, at xiii.
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that one person gives a favor or gift to gain the gratitude of another.
"Reciprocity is normally desirable, a cornerstone of human relation-
ships in economic, social, political, and personal matters," writes
Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein.9 It is common for friends or
business partners to exchange gifts or treat each other to meals or
special events to gain one another's gratitude. 10 Reciprocity is also
present in many religions, as worshippers pray and make offerings to
gain the gratitude of their gods. In fact, most societies find anoma-
lous a relationship in which favors are not returned.11 "Fault lies not
with the giver but with the nonreciprocator.'
' 2
Upon closer examination, however, one can distinguish bribery
from other forms of reciprocity by putting it in its proper context.
13
Most mutually beneficial exchanges take place between individuals
acting in their own interests. 14 Yet, it is different when one of the
parties is a public official. Through the act of voting, the public puts
the public official into office as a "steward" of the people and en-
trusts the official to act on the public's behalf.15 By accepting a bribe
or gift, the public official is no longer acting in the interest of the
general public, but rather in his own interests. "Those who, having
voluntarily assumed public office, set aside the public trust for pri-
vate advantage (and those who tempt public officials to do so) en-
gage in morally reprehensible conduct by striking at the roots of fair-
ness and democracy. ' 16 For that reason, "[w]e want a special crime,
with a special stigma, for such conduct."'
17
Because a pluralistic society routinely subjects public officials,
especially elected officials, to a wide range of pressures and deals,
the question becomes which pressures are tolerable and which are
9. Lowenstein, Review, supra note 5, at 1481.
10. "The practice of using hospitality, including lavish hospitality, to culti-
vate business or political relationships is longstanding and pervasive." United
States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 741 (1st Cir. 1996).
11. See NOONAN, supra note 2, at 4.
12. Id.
13. See id. at xiii.
14. See Lowenstein, Review, supra note 5, at 1482.
15. See id.
16. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 806 (1985) [hereinafter Lowenstein, Interme-
diate Theory].
17. Id.
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improper. 18 In other words, when is a gift to a public official just a
gift, and when is it more?
Bribery and illegal gratuities statutes attempt to draw the line
between allowable and unethical conduct. One of the major goals of
such statutes is to guard against practices that skew outcomes in fa-
vor of some groups and against others, especially if the skewing rein-
forces political inequalities caused by other societal conditions. 19 In
so doing, these laws protect those that do not have the political or fi-
nancial leverage to peddle influence. This is especially important in
the modem American political system, where the gap between the
"haves" and "have-nots" has widened, and the level of lobbying and
influence-buying has increased.
B. Why Individuals and Corporations Give Bribes and Illegal
Gratuities and Why Public Officials Accept Them
The causes of bribery are obvious, but worthy of discussion,
nonetheless. On the giving side, bribers offer bribes to gain some
degree of security and peace of mind in an ever-changing world
fraught with risks and insecurities. Since "[i]nfluence is a matter of
probabilities," "[t]he briber influences the official if the gift increases
the probability that the official will act as the briber hopes."2 Brib-
ers can reduce risks, uncertainties, and market inadequacies by en-
suring that public officials give them preferential treatment.21 In
some cases, corruption may also be necessary to correct bureaucratic
inertia, as illustrated by the contractor who pays off a public official
to expedite approval of building plans through the governmental
22quagmire. In addition to the motives of risk reduction and profit
maximization, the corporate structure itself facilitates
18. See George D. Brown, The Gratuities Offense and the RICO Approach
to Independent Counsel Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2052 (1998).
19. See Lowenstein, Intermediate Theory, supra note 16, at 849.
20. Id. at 825 (footnote omitted).
21. See John Hogarth, Bribery of Officials in Pursuit of Corporate Aims, 6
CRIM. L.F. 557, 562 (1995).
22. See id. Hogarth writes: "Survival in the current environment requires
more than keeping a company in the black. In the struggle for market domina-
tion, staying still is not an option." Id.
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bribery through the division of labor, thereby making "each
individual employee's role in corrupt schemes appear innocuous. 23
On the receiving side, big government has numerous character-
istics which make it especially vulnerable to bribery and corruption.
These features include
poor salaries in comparison to similar jobs in the private
sector; ill-defined tasks and roles; absence of a clear man-
date or purpose; few, if any, performance measures for the
organization as a whole, or for individual staff; promotion
based on seniority rather than performance; communication
blocks that isolate management from line staff; lack of su-
pervision over, or even visibility to, tasks performed; exces-
sive delegation of authority; rules that are contradictory,
unworkable, or not enforced; and top-heavy management
structures involving several layers of officials.24
Public officials also are susceptible to bribes because, like the
rest of society, they are motivated by self-interest and often are able
to enhance their prospects for re-election and advancement by ac-
cepting bribes and gifts.25 In describing the relationship between
lobbyists and public officials, one insider noted: "[I]t's a two-way
street. A lot of times the [public officials] are shaking down the lob-
byists.,
2 6
Bribery is also facilitated by the fact that it is hard to detect.
There are enormous costs and complexities to investigating allega-
tions of bribery and corruption, and the results of such investigations
are often fruitless. "Very few corporate or government officials are
prosecuted, fewer still are convicted, and even fewer are impris-
oned.",2 7  In the end, because the motivation to offer and accept
bribes is strong, and few offenders pay the consequences, it is not
23. Id. at 563.
24. Id. at 563-64.
25. See Lowenstein, Intermediate Theory, supra note 16, at 836. By one
estimate, "[s]ome congressmen must raise as much as $25,000 a week just to
stay competitive, and the lobbyists hold the ATM card." 60 Minutes: The
Lobbyist (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 22, 1999) (transcript produced by
Burrelle's Information Services) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
26. 60 Minutes, supra note 25.
27. Hogarth, supra note 21, at 566.
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the least bit surprising that people give bribes and public officials ac-
cept them for their mutual benefit and advancement.
C. Buying Influence in the United States
Bribery is not a new concept to Americans. The United States
Constitution mentions both treason and bribery by name.21 In the
past, outright bribery was the preferred mode of corruption in
America, leaving behind a lengthy line of scandals such as Credit
Mobilier, Teapot Dome, Abscam, and numerous embarrassing reve-
lations of official corruption in New Jersey, Louisiana, West Vir-
ginia, and sister states. 29 So pervasive have been bribery and cor-
ruption in American politics through the years that they are the
subject of countless works of art and literature, including Thomas
Nast's caricatures of William "Boss" Tweed in Harper's Weekly
during the 1870s, 30 and Robert Penn Warren's truth-based fictional
tale of Louisiana politician Willie Stark in "All the King's Men."
Although blatant corruption is not as pervasive in the United
States as it once was, more subtle and guileful forms remain. Some
commentators have suggested that the complete eradication of cor-
ruption from the American political system is somewhat "utopian."
31
Even as corruption in government has leveled out over the years, the
public still perceives most politicians as corrupt. In response to a
poll question asking if Americans can trust the government in
Washington to do what is right most of the time, seventy-six percent
of Americans answered yes in 1964, while only nineteen percent an-
swered yes in 1996.32 This cynicism likely can be traced to the
28. See NOONAN, supra note 2, at xvi.
29. See LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS:
THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 21-22 (1996).
30. Tweed's "ugly features, small beady eyes, huge banana-like nose, vul-
turish expression and bloated body are the personification of big-city corrup-
tion." LEO HERSHKOwITZ, TWEED'S NEW YORK: ANOTHER LOOK xiii (1977).
31. NEIL H. JACOBY ET AL., BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD
BUSINESS: A STUDY OF CORPORATE POLITICAL PAYMENTS ABROAD 42-43
(1977); see also SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 29, at 23 ("Any crusade to
eradicate corruption is naive and doomed to failure .... ).
32. See Alan Murray, Foreword to SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 29, at
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Watergate affair and the more recent scandals of the 1980s and
1990s administrations.
Today, the buying of influence in the United States is as wide-
spread as ever, but in many ways it is cloaked by the legitimacy of
lobbying and campaign contributions. The rise of lobbying activities
in Washington has increased dramatically in the past few years. In
1998 alone, lobbyists in Washington spent approximately $1.5 bil-
lion-more than $100 million a month-to influence legislators.
33
From 1961 to 1982, the number of corporate headquarters in Wash-
ington increased tenfold,34 and since President Bill Clinton took of-
fice, registered lobbyists skyrocketed from 7500 to over 15000.
35
Most of these lobbying activities are both legitimate and legal,
though it is debatable whether they are truly democratic.36 Yet, out-
right bribery persists: "It is a significant and politically relevant fact
that under our present system of campaign finance, politicians and
interest groups engage routinely ... in felonious bribery that goes
unprosecuted primarily because the crime is so pervasive."
37
D. Codification of Bribery and Ilegal Gratuities Statutes
Usually at the public's behest, American politicians have made
efforts over the decades to eliminate, or at the very least control,
bribery and corruption in politics. Initially, bribery was a common
law offense applicable only to judicial actions, but statutes gradually
expanded the offense to all official actions.38 Today, bribery is a
statutory offense, codified by Congress in 1962 in 18 U.S.C. § 201.
Section 201 is divided into three parts: subsection (a) contains defi-
nitions, subsection (b) prohibits both giving and accepting a bribe,
and subsection (c) prohibits both giving and accepting an illegal
gratuity.
33. See 60 Minutes, supra note 25.
34. See Stacie L. Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Note, Protecting the Right to
Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency Fee Prohibition Violates the Constitu-
tion, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559, 567 (1998).
35. See 60 Minutes, supra note 25.
36. Many groups and individuals simply lack the resources to afford lob-
byists or provide gratuities to a public official that would put them in the pub-
lic official's favor. See Brown, supra note 18, at 2054.
37. Lowenstein, Intermediate Theory, supra note 16, at 848.
38. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENsTEIN, ELECTION LAw 425 (1995).
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To many, the concepts of giving bribes and of giving illegal
gratuities are synonymous, and at least one court has characterized
the difference between the two as "slight." 39 Yet Congress has dis-
tinguished them by creating separate crimes with separate punish-
ments. Like state bribery statutes, § 201(b) creates the following five
elements for bribery:
(1) There must be a public official involved.
(2) The defendant must have a corrupt intent.
(3) A benefit, anything of value, must accrue to the public
official.
(4) There must be a relationship between the thing of
value and some official act.
(5) The relationship must involve an intent to influence the
public official (or to be influenced if the defendant is
the official) in the carrying out of the official act.
40
The common law elements of giving and accepting an illegal gratu-
ity, by contrast, are included in § 201(c):
(1) There must be a current or former public official in-
volved. A transaction involving a former official,
however, can be an unlawful gratuity, but not a bribe.
(2) There is no requirement of corrupt intent.
(3) A benefit, or something of value, must accrue to the
public official.
(4) There must be a relationship between the thing of
value and some official act.
(5) There must be an intent that the benefit pass to the
public official "for or because of' the official act. Un-
like bribery, however, there need be no intent that the
official act be influenced by the benefit.
4 1
39. United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1974). "The lines
between conduct constituting... bribery [and] payment of an illegal gratuity..
. to a public official are poorly defined and often turn on minor differences in
the parties' intent." Elkan Abramowitz, Navigating the Shoals of Political
Gift-Giving, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 1999, at 1.
40. See LOwENSTEIN, supra note 38, at 435; Lowenstein, Intermediate
Theory, supra note 16, at 796.
41. See Lowenstein, Intermediate Theory, supra note 16, at 797.
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"The primary difference between bribery and illegal gratuities is
that bribery requires a corrupt intent, while an illegal gratuity does
not. ' 42 The quid pro quo requirement means that, for behavior in-
volving bribery to be actionable, a public official must allow the re-
ceipt of the gift to influence his decision on an identifiable matter.a3
Usually, illegal gratuities are "merely a reward for some future act
that the public official will take (and may already have determined to
take), or for a past act that he has already taken."
44
Illegal gratuities are not as severe as bribes, as indicated by the
levels of punishment for each.45 Yet prosecutors are more likely to
bring cases under the illegal gratuities statute than under the bribery
statute because the elements of bribery are harder to prove.4 6 Viola-
tion of the bribery statute may be punished by up to fifteen years'
imprisonment, a fine of $250,000 ($500,000 for organizations), or
triple the value of the bribe, whichever is greater, and disqualifica-
tion from holding government office.4 7 By contrast, violation of §
201(c)(1)(A), the illegal gratuities statute may be punished by up to
two years' imprisonment and a fine of $250,000 ($500,000 for or-
ganizations).48
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to exam-
ine § 201(c), the illegal gratuities statute, in United States v. Sun-
Diamond Growers,49 a high-profile case involving gifts to former
Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy from a California agricultural
42. Suzette Richards & Robert Warren Topp, Federal Criminal Conflict of
Interest, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 629, 631 (1999); see LOWENSTEIN, supra note
38, at 436.
43. See Medrith Lee Hager, The Hobbs Act: Maintaining the Distinction
Between a Bribe and a Gift, 83 KY. L.J. 197, 200 (1995). "Proof of a quid pro
quo does not necessarily require proof of an express agreement. Such a stan-
dard would unduly hamper prosecution while encouraging more subtle forms
of illegal activity." Id. (footnotes omitted).
44. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 119 S. Ct. 1402, 1406 (1999)
(Sun-Diamond 1).
45. See id.
46. See Robert S. Greenberger, Top Court Rules for Sun-Diamond Over
Smaltz, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1999, at B12. Prosecutors also frequently prefer
the illegal gratuities statute because those who deal in bribes are less willing to
cooperate in the investigation and prosecution. See id.
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994); Sun-DiamondI, 119 S. Ct. at 1406.
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c); Sun-DiamondI, 119 S. Ct. at 1406.
49. 119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999) (Sun-Diamond1).
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cooperative. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Antonin Scalia
stated the issue in the case as "whether conviction under the illegal
gratuity statute requires any showing beyond the fact that a gratuity
was given because of the recipient's official position."5 ° The United
States, represented by Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz, urged
that the indictment did not have to allege a direct nexus between the
things of value conferred to Secretary Espy by Sun-Diamond and an
official act performed or to be performed by Espy. Under Smaltz's
proposed standard, all that was needed to convict Sun-Diamond was
to show that it provided things of value to Espy because of his offi-
cial position.
51
The Supreme Court rejected that argument, instead stating the
following: "[I]n order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
201(c)(1)(A), the Government must prove a link between a thing of
value conferred upon a public official and a specific 'official act' for
or because of which it was given." 52 As Justice Scalia put it, "[a]
statute in this field that can linguistically be interpreted to be either a
meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be the latter."
53
At least part of the reason that the Court arrived at its decision is that
a broad interpretation of § 201(c) would have criminalized benign
token gifts to public officials based on their official positions and not
linked to any identifiable act.54
The effects of the Sun-Diamond I decision are numerous and
far-reaching. Lobbyists praised the ruling, saying that Smaltz's pro-
posed standard "would [have] broadly criminalize[d] a range of
harmless gift-giving and undercut an individual's legitimate right to
curry general goodwill, keep doors open and try to influence gov-
ernment." 55  Critics, on the other hand, believed that the
50. Id. at 1404.
51. See id. at 1405-06.
52. Id. at 1411.
53. Id. at 1410.
54. See id. at 1407. Some of the examples raised include giving token
sports jerseys to the president at White House ceremonies, and providing the
secretary of agriculture a complimentary lunch in conjunction with a speech to
farmers. See id.
55. Joan Biskupic, Court Shows Reluctance on Strict Gifts Law, WASH.
POST, Mar. 3, 1999, at A2 [hereinafter Biskupic, Reluctance].
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"Supreme Court ha[d] just opened the door to an era of graft and cor-
ruption that would make Tammany blush."
56
However one views this particular decision, one thing is clear:
the Court's interpretation of § 201(c) offers "ample latitude to lob-
byists trying to secure access in the nation's capital and makes it
harder to prosecute someone under the statute by requiring prosecu-
tors to prove the gift was connected to a specific official action."
57
Some have even gone so far as to say that "[tihanks to [the] ... Su-
preme Court ruling, every day is Christmas for many high-ranking
federal officials."
58
The fact that, under current law, corporations and individuals
can bestow extravagant gifts and money upon public officials, as
long as the latter do not perform official acts in exchange, is indeed
troubling. In the Sun-Diamond I case, "[t]his flies in the face of
common sense. Even if Espy did not perform an obvious service for
raisin and nut producers, the gifts were meant to curry favor and buy
influence." 59 Likewise, in almost every other case, "there are, have
been, or are likely to be matters of interest to the donor pending be-
fore the donee." 60 Not even the most honest politician, "who knows
the identity and business interests of his .. .contributors[,] is ever
completely devoid of knowledge as to the inspiration behind the do-
nation.
' 61
At bottom, therefore, "the government should be able to set lim-
its on gift-giving even in the absence of a tit-for-tat deal., 62  As
written and interpreted, the illegal gratuities statute is simply too am-
biguous to prevent influence-peddling effectively. Both the Supreme
Court in the Sun-Diamond I decision and Independent Counsel
Smaltz, who unsuccessfully employed the gratuities statute to prose-
cute Espy and Sun-Diamond, intimated that the gratuities
56. Ellen Weintraub, Reports of Gratuities Law's Demise Are Greatly Ex-
aggerated, ROLL CALL, May 6, 1999, at Al.
57. Joan Biskupic, High Court Narrows Law on Gratuities in Espy Case,
WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Biskupic, High Court].
58. Opinion, Court Decision Puzzling, HERALD, May 12, 1999, at 1 1A.
59. Id.
60. Brown, supra note 18, at 2065.
61. United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
62. Opinion, supra note 58, at 11A.
June 2000] 1823
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:1813
laws should be refined by Congress or the Office of Government
Ethics to cover more subtle but harmful forms of gift-giving.
63
E. The Need for Stronger Gratuities Laws
Corruption of public officials is always a timely topic because
such corruption wreaks enormous long-term economic and social
costs. "Among the direct consequences ultimately borne by the tax-
payer are increases in the cost of government due to noncompetitive
bidding on government contracts, nonproductive use of money for
bribes, loss of tax revenues, erosion of the free market... , and en-
forcement and prosecution costs to investigate and convict wrongdo-
ers. ' ' 64 More importantly, however, corruption and influence-buying
in government have the intangible effect of decreasing the public's
trust in government and increasing apathy among voters. As one
commentator noted,
[t]he problem with this system is not that there are too
many lobbyists, but that the skilled lobbyists are linked only
to the large and powerful business and social issue groups
that can afford them. Thus the voices of individual citizens,
minorities, and under-funded causes are shut out of political
discourse because they cannot be heard without the inter-
mediary of a professional lobbyist.65
Once we understand the importance of fixing the gift-giving
system, we can begin to address its problems. But we must also ap-
preciate our limitations. "Any crusade to eradicate corruption," write
Larry J. Sabato and Glenn R. Simpson, "is naive and doomed to fail-
ure, but corruption can be controlled and limited. ' 66 Bribery laws
should encourage elected officials to pursue their interests in a man-
ner that also serves the public interest. A set of laws that forbids
much of what a politician needs to do on a daily basis cannot serve
this purpose because it cannot be obeyed or enforced.67
63. See Sun-Diamond I, 119 S. Ct. at 1408; Biskupic, High Court, supra
note 57, at Al.
64. Hogarth, supra note 21, at 559.
65. Fatka & Levien, supra note 34, at 567-68.
66. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 29, at 23.
67. See Lowenstein, Intermediate Theory, supra note 16, at 836.
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It is therefore important to strike a balance between what is ideal
and what is realistic. Professor Lowenstein calls this balance the
"intermediate theory of politics." 68 On the one hand, we want to en-
courage public discourse between all constituents and organizations
with their public officials since such communication leads to wiser
and more effective legislation. Cutting off the public from its offi-
cials would only increase apathy and distrust of government.
It is sometimes considered appropriate at these interactions to
exchange gratuitious favors, such as when the secretary of education
visits and brings notoriety to a local high school and receives a
school baseball cap in return.69 Obviously, these are not the kind of
exchanges that we want to investigate and prosecute because they are
relatively harmless.70 Furthermore, as already mentioned, such in-
vestigations are both expensive and time consuming. Indeed, the in-
vestigation and prosecution by Independent Counsel Smaltz of Sec-
retary Espy and the agricultural companies that gave him roughly
$33,000 in gifts took four years and cost around seventeen million
dollars.7 1 In the end, the jury acquitted Espy on all charges, and the
Supreme Court reversed Sun-Diamond's conviction.72
Yet, while it is important for the public and governmental enti-
ties to interact, we want to limit such interaction so that more ideas
than money are exchanged. It is one thing to influence legislation,
but it is a far different matter to buy favorable legislation. Appar-
ently the jury and the Supreme Court in the Espy matter considered it
acceptable, under current law, for Sun-Diamond to bestow large gifts
upon Espy as long as he did not perform an official act for
68. Id. at 784.
69. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 119 S. Ct. 1402, 1407-08
(1999) (Sun-Diamond l).
70. "The ability of lobbyists to develop and maintain legitimate relation-
ships with government officials-which effectuate the citizen's right to peti-
tion, facilitate the flow of information, and inform decisionmaking-would be
severely and unnecessarily hindered by the fear of criminal prosecution."
Brief of American League of Lobbyists as Amicus Curiae in Support of Re-
spondent at 4-5, United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 119 S. Ct. 1402
(1999) (No. 98-131).
71. See Lyle Denniston, Not All Gifts Are Payoffs, High Court Rules,
BALTIMORE SuN, Apr. 28, 1999, at 3A.
72. See Sun-Diamond I, 119 S. Ct. at 1411; Matt Bai, The Trials of Mike
Espy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 14, 1998, at 34.
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Sun-Diamond. Yet, one can just as easily argue that these gifts were
meant to create a reservoir of good favor with Secretary Espy which
he would eventually take into account in the course of his official
duties. In other words, what first appeared to be a legal gratuity
could become a bribe or illegal gratuity, "the facts of which cannot
be proved or have not come to light."73 Even if the gifts do not in-
fluence the public official at some point, they nevertheless represent
a classic "appearance" problem. "Although perhaps to a lesser de-
gree than [outright] bribes, gratuities present risks of preferential
treatment, divided loyalty, and inefficient government."
74
At present, the illegal gratuities statute does not cover situations
where influence is cheaply bought with fancy dinners, tickets to
sporting events, or free vacations. 75 That is not to say that these ac-
tivities are not regulated by other statutes.76 Yet, with stronger and
less ambiguous gratuities laws on the books, it will be easier to
prosecute public officials and bribers for conduct that adversely af-
fects the public at large without disrupting the everyday function of
pluralist politics.
73. Brown, supra note 18, at 2054.
74. Id.
75. See Opinion, supra note 58, at 1 1A.
76. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1994) (making illegal the acts of giving to or
receiving from a federal employee compensation in consideration of the em-
ployee's representational assistance to anyone involved in a proceeding in
which the United States has a direct and substantial interest); id. § 205(a)(1)
(making it illegal for federal employees to act as "agent or attorney" for any-
one prosecuting a claim against the United States); id. § 205(a)(2) (making it
illegal for a federal employee to act as "agent or attorney" for anyone appear-
ing before virtually any government tribunal in connection with a matter in
which the United States has a direct and substantial interest); id. § 207 (making
it illegal for various types of federal employees to engage in assorted activities
after completion of their federal service); id. § 208 (making it illegal for an ex-
ecutive branch employee to participate in any decision or proceeding relating
to a matter in which he has a financial interest); id. § 209 (making it illegal for
an officer or employee of any independent agency of the United States to re-
ceive "any contribution to or supplementation of salary ... from any source
other than the Government of the United States"); id. 217 (making it illegal for
a federal employee to accept a gift in connection with the "compromise, ad-
justment, or cancellation of any farm indebtedness .... ).
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F. Court Interpretation of the Bribery and
illegal Gratuities Statutes Leading Up to Sun-Diamond
In 1962, Congress consolidated and codified statutes relating to
bribery and illegal gratuities into 18 U.S.C. § 201. 77 Subsection (a)
contains definitions, while subsections (b)(1) and (2) define, respec-
tively, bribery and acceptance of a bribe:
(b) Whoever-
(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or
promises anything of value to any public official or
person who has been selected to be a public official, or
offers or promises any public official or any person
who has been selected to be a public official to give
anything of value to any other person or entity, with
intent-
(A) to influence any official act; or
(B) to influence such public official or person
who has been selected to be a public offi-
cial to commit or aid in committing, or
collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make
opportunity for the commission of any
fraud, on the United States; or
(C) to induce such public official or such per-
son who has been selected to be a public
official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such offi-
cial or person;
(2) being a public official or person selected to be a
public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly de-
mands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or
accept anything of value personally or for any other
person or entity, in return for:
(A) being influenced in the performance of
any official act;
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in
77. See Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994)).
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committing, or to collude in, or allow, any
fraud, or make opportunity for the com-
mission of any fraud on the United States;
or
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act
in violation of the official duty of such of-
ficial or person;
shall be fined ... or imprisoned for not more than fifteen
years... or both, and may be disqualified from holding any
office.., under the United States.78
In § 201(c), Congress defined the lesser offense of giving and
receiving an illegal gratuity:
(c) Whoever-
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper
discharge of official duty-
(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or
promises anything of value to any public
official, former public official, or person
selected to be a public official, for or be-
cause of any official act performed or to
be performed by such public official,
former public official, or person selected
to be a public official; or
(B) being a public official, former public offi-
cial, or person selected to be a public offi-
cial, otherwise than as provided by law
for the proper discharge of official duty,
directly or indirectly demands, seeks, re-
ceives, accepts, or agrees to receive or ac-
cept anything of value personally for or
because of any official act performed or
to be performed by such official or per-
son;
78. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b).
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shall be fined . ..or imprisoned for not more than two
years, or both.79
The congressional purpose in enacting gratuity legislation was
to eliminate the "tendency... to provide conscious or unconscious
preferential treatment of the donor by the donee." 80 According to
Congress, as the government's activities became greater and more
complex-bringing the government into closer contact with the pri-
vate sector-the necessity for maintaining high ethical standards of
behavior amongst public officials increased.81 In United States v.
Evans, the Supreme Court stated the following about the illegal gra-
tuities statute:
Congress proceeded evidently in recognition of the princi-
ple that "No man can serve two masters," and that it was
not right that an officer should agree to accept fees for do-
ing services in matters where the United States is interested,
before any officer of the government. The performance of
duty by an officer is compensated by the salary or fees
regularly allowed by law. To permit agreements for other
compensation for services, to be paid by those interested in
matters before government officers, would be to counte-
nance the rendering of services oftentimes inconsistent with
fidelity to the best interests of the government, to which the
employ6 owes his first and highest obligation.82
While there is almost universal agreement that giving and re-
ceiving gratuities and favors is morally reprehensible, unfortunately
"[t]he federal cases interpreting § 201 are not consistent., 83 In par-
ticular, courts are split in their interpretation of the "for or because
of' language in the statute.
79. Id. § 201(c).
80. United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978).
81. See S. REP. No. 87-2213 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852,
3853.
82. Evans, 572 F.2d at 480 (quoting United States v. Booth, 148 F. 112,
116 (D. Or. 1906)).
83. Brown, supra note 18, at 2062.
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1. Direct nexus approach
Some courts have interpreted those words to require a direct
nexus between the gratuity given and a specifically identified official
act to convict the people who gave or received the gratuity. This ap-
proach is best called the "direct nexus" approach, and is represented
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in United States v. Brewster.84 According to the court,
"[t]here must be more specific knowledge of a definite official act
for which the contributor intends to compensate before an official's
action crosses the line between guilt and innocence."
85
Brewster dealt with a senator who received gratuities from a
mail order company that had an interest in defeating the enactment of
pending legislation that would increase postal rates. 86 The Brewster
court was "plainly concerned with the chilling effect that an expan-
sive reading of... gratuities statutes could have on well-established
political practices." 87 The court, therefore, took pains to raise the
standard for convicting a party under the illegal gratuities statute, es-
sentially construing the gratuity provisions of § 201 as similar to the
bribery provisions.8 8 The decision in Brewster also emphasized that
the senator was an elected official, as opposed to an appointed offi-
cial, requiring more of a direct nexus for campaign contributions in
an effort to protect the campaign finance system.89 Many courts
have used this distinction to interpret the illegal gratuities statute in a
completely opposite manner.
90
2. Status approach
While Brewster required a direct nexus between the gratuity and
an official act, other courts have taken a decidedly different ap-
proach, requiring only that the gift be given because the public
84. 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 81; see also United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (approving of a jury charge requiring "that the alleged gratuities be
given and received 'knowingly and willingly,' and "'for or because of an offi-
cial act"').
86. See Brewster, 506 F.2d at 64-65.
87. Brown, supra note 18, at 2062.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 2064.
90. See id.
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official held a certain position or status.91 This "status" approach is
best represented in Evans, where the Fifth Circuit stated the follow-
ing:
[U]nder the unlawful gratuity subsection all that need be
proven is that the official accepted, because of his position,
a thing of value "otherwise than as provided by law for the
proper discharge of official duty." Thus, [the illegal gratui-
ties statute] makes it criminal for a public official to accept
a thing of value to which he is not lawfully entitled, re-
gardless of the intent of the donor or donee.
92
Evans involved a defendant convicted of accepting an illegal
gratuity in his official capacity at the United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, in connection with collection of de-
linquent student loans. 93 In contrast to Brewster, the Evans decision
effectively made it easier to prosecute the public official by requiring
the government to prove only that a gift was given because of the of-
ficial's position instead of for a particular act.94 As will be dis-
cussed, much of the criticism concerning Evans and the status ap-
proach is that it gives prosecutors too much power to convict givers
and receivers of illegal gratuities.
Given the different circuits' lack of uniformity in interpreting
the illegal gratuities statute, the time was ripe for the Supreme
91. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1995)
("[I]t is sufficient for the government to show that the defendant was given the
gratuity simply because he held public office."); United States v. Standefer,
610 F.2d 1076, 1080 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) ("All that was required in order
to convict [the defendant] was that the jury conclude that the gifts were given
by him for or because of [the public official's] official position, and not solely
for reasons of friendship or social purposes."); United States v. Umans, 368
F.2d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 1966) ("[The illegal gratuities statute] makes it criminal
to pay an official a sum which he is not entitled to receive regardless of the in-
tent of either payor or payee with respect to the payment."); United States v.
Secord, 726 F. Supp. 845, 847 (D.D.C. 1989) ("The Government need not
prove that the gratuity was given in exchange for any specific official act; there
need be no 'quid pro quo' .... [T]he Government must [only] show that De-
fendant acted simply because of [the individual's] official position.").
92. United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation
omitted).
93. See id. at 475.
94. See id. at 480.
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Court to settle the issue authoritatively. This opportunity presented
itself in the Sun-Diamond case.
III. THE SUN-DIAMOND CASE
A. Facts of Sun-Diamond
In August of 1997, Independent Counsel Donald C. Smaltz
charged Sun-Diamond Growers, a large agricultural cooperative
owned by individual cooperatives including Diamond Walnut Grow-
ers, Sun-Maid Growers of California, Sunsweet Growers, Valley Fig
Growers, and Hazelnut Growers of Oregon, with, among other vio-
lations, making illegal gifts to former Secretary of Agriculture Mi-
chael Espy.95  Specifically, count one of the indictment charged
95. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961, 963 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Sun-Diamond I1). One should note that the illegal gratuities statute
permits prosecutors to go after both those giving gratuities as well as those re-
ceiving gratuities. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)-(2) (1994). Therefore, Inde-
pendent Counsel Smaltz prosecuted not only Sun-Diamond (the gift giver), but
also Secretary Espy (the gift receiver) in a separate trial. See United States v.
Espy, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998). The indictment in the Espy case
charged the Secretary himself with over 30 counts of accepting over $33,000 in
illegal gratuities from Sun-Diamond and other agricultural organizations, such
as Arkansas-based Tyson Foods. See id. at 2. In that trial, Smaltz called over
70 witnesses in seven weeks of testimony. See Bill Miller, As Espy Trial Ends,
Its Insight into Gifts and Favors Is Murky, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1998, at
A2 1. And despite the fact that criminal defense attorney Ted Wells did not call
a single witness, it took the jury just nine hours to acquit Espy on all counts of
wrongdoing. See Bai, supra note 72, at 34. After the prolonged investigation
and trial, Wells said, "'The jury could see that the Mickey Mouse stuff they
were trying to accuse Mike of didn't even occur .... It was absurd. This was
a heavy-handed and unfair prosecution and the jury knew it."' Charles Whi-
taker, Mike Espy: Bruised But Unbowed, EBONY, Apr. 1999, at 146. Indeed, at
the unveiling ceremony of his portrait at the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
President Bill Clinton announced, "'Mike, the jury redeemed you, and you
belong to the American people, and we are very proud of you."' Terry M.
Neal, At USDA Event, Espy is Portrait of Triumph, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
1998, at A29.
For a look at other cases involving gratuities given to and accepted by
Secretary Espy, see United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
In re Espy, 145 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Williams, 29 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998). Interestingly, while Espy and Sun-Diamond ulti-
mately prevailed in their legal battles against the independent counsel, compa-
nies such as Tyson Foods simply agreed to pay fines of six million dollars to
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Sun-Diamond with giving Espy approximately $5900 in illegal gra-
tuities, including tickets to the U.S. Open Tennis Tournament worth
$2295, luggage worth $2427, meals worth $665, and a framed print
and crystal bowl worth $524.96 Sun-Diamond also gave Patricia
Dempsey, Espy's then-girlfriend, $3200 in cash so that she could pay
for airfare to accompany Espy on a business trip to Greece. 97 Sun-
Diamond transferred the gifts to Espy through Richard Douglas, the
vice president for corporate affairs whose chief responsibility in-
cluded representing the interests of the corporation and its members
in Washington.98 Espy and Douglas had been long-time friends
since the two attended college together at Howard University.
99
Espy claimed that he thought Douglas gave Espy the gifts personally,
but it was later revealed that Sun-Diamond reimbursed Douglas for
his expenditures on the gifts.100 At a separate trial, Douglas testified
that he never asked Espy for any favors for the company and that
Espy never provided any.
101
Still, the indictment detailed two specific issues on which Sun-
Diamond had a clear interest in favorable action by Secretary Espy.
The first involved Espy adopting a regulatory definition of "small-
sized entities" to include cooperatives such as Sun-Diamond's mem-
bers, thereby entitling them to grant funds under a market promotion
program (MPP) administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
avoid a more costly legal battle. See Bai, supra note 72, at 34.
96. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 119 S. Ct. 1402, 1405
(1999) (Sun-Diamond 1). The indictment also charged a separate criminal
scheme involving illegal campaign contributions by Sun-Diamond to Espy's
brother, Henry, who unsuccessfully ran for Michael Espy's congressional seat
when Michael Espy was appointed the secretary of agriculture. See Audrey
Strauss, The Legal Story Behind the Espy Acquittal, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 1999, at
5 n.2 [hereinafter Strauss, Legal Story]. Sun-Diamond was convicted on those
counts and the convictions were affirmed. See id.
97. See Bai, supra note 72, at 34.
98. See Sun-Diamond II, 138 F.3d at 963-64.
99. See id. at 964. So close were Espy and Douglas that the latter had a
spare key to Espy's Maryland home, where Espy sometimes cooked for
Douglas and Douglas's girlfriend. See Bai, supra note 72, at 34.
100. See Bai, supra note 72, at 34. Furthermore, Sun-Diamond increased
Douglas's compensation as a result of his success in advancing Sun-
Diamond's interests with Secretary Espy. See United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers, 964 F. Supp. 486, 491 (D.D.C. 1996) (Sun-Diamond 111).
101. See Miller, supra note 95, at A21.
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(USDA). 10 2 Second, Sun-Diamond had an interest in an Environ-
mental Protection Agency plan to phase out the use of methyl bro-
mide, a pesticide used by some of the growers who belonged to the
member cooperatives.10 3 The indictment did not, however, allege a
direct nexus between the issues before Secretary Espy and the gra-
tuities conferred. 1
04
B. Deciding the Case
The evolution of the Sun-Diamond case from the district court to
the Supreme Court reflects the difficulty courts encountered in con-
struing the illegal gratuities issue. Only after the Supreme Court de-
cision did the meaning of § 201(c) become evident.
1. The district court decision, trial, and verdict
Initially, the Sun-Diamond case was heard by Judge Ricardo
Urbina in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. Sun-Diamond moved to dismiss the indictment using the direct
nexus approach. 10 5 In other words, Sun-Diamond claimed that it was
innocent absent a showing of a direct nexus between the gifts it gave
Secretary Espy and an official act that he performed for Sun-
Diamond. 10 6 Judge Urbina rejected this argument, stating the fol-
lowing:
[T]he definition of "official act" denotes that the official
need not have undertaken or committed himself to under-
take a specific act. An official act is one which involves
"any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding, or controversy, which may at the time be
pending. Presently, the indictment alleges that there were
two matters pending before Secretary Espy in which Sun-
Diamond had a significant interest. There is no indication
102. The appellate court notes that while Sun-Diamond and its members
"were hardly mom-and-pop organizations-they reported net sales of $648
million for fiscal year 1993-.... many of their constituent growers were quite
modest in size." Sun-Diamond II, 138 F.3d at 964.
103. See Sun-DiamondI, 119 S. Ct. at 1405.
104. See id.
105. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 941 F. Supp. 1262, 1265
(D.D.C. 1996) (Sun-DiamondlV).
106. See id.
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that the gratuity statute or the definition of the term "official
act" require the indictment to allege that Sun-Diamond in-
tended to reward Secretary Espy for an act that he had done
or committed himself to do.1
0 7
In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Urbina appeared to en-
dorse the status approach espoused by the Evans line of cases. Spe-
cifically, he wrote that "it is sufficient for the indictment to allege
that Secretary Espy received things of value because of his status as
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture."'
10 8
Subsequently, the case went to trial in September of 1996. In
accordance with the status approach, the district court charged the
jury with instructions that made "it a crime for a person or company
to knowingly and willingly give a public official a thing of value be-
cause of his official position whether or not the giver or receiver in-
tended that a particular official's acts be influenced."' 0 9 Indeed,
"time and again the jury instructions hammered home [the] theme"
that it was sufficient if the motivating factor for the payment was to
keep the official happy or to create a better relationship with the offi-
cial because of his status.
1 0
With these instructions, the jury convicted Sun-Diamond of
violating the illegal gratuities statute."' Following the conviction,
Sun-Diamond renewed its motion for judgment of acquittal on the
indictment but was again rejected by Judge Urbina.112
The district court's adherence to the status approach is a well-
intended, but flawed approach to controlling influence-peddling. By
denying Sun-Diamond's repeated attempts to dismiss the indictment
and by instructing the jury as it did, the court seemed intent on both
following precedent and making it easier for prosecutors to convict
companies such as Sun-Diamond. But while the court's use of the
status approach may be popular with a public frustrated with corrup-
tion, it is not entirely practical.
107. Id. at 1267 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 1268 (footnote omitted).
109. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961, 965 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (Sun-Diamond I1).
110. Id.
111. See Sun-DiamondlV, 964 F. Supp. at 488.
112. See id. at 494.
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The status approach is overbroad in that it criminalizes harmless
gift-giving (baking brownies) as well as harmful, yet subtle, gift-
giving (crystal bowls, meals, tickets to sporting events). By punish-
ing just about everyone involved, it does not even attempt to draw a
line between allowable and non-allowable conduct. One is left to
wonder when a gift is simply too lavish to be considered just a gift.
The circuit court was quick to recognize these shortcomings and cast
them aside.
2. The circuit court decision
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Sun-
Diamond's conviction. 113 In an opinion written by Judge Stephen F.
Williams, the appellate court rejected the status approach and held
erroneous the district court's jury instructions. 114 Wrote Judge Wil-
liams:
Given that the "for or because of any official act" language
in § 201(c)(1)(A) means what it says, the jury instructions
invited the jury to convict on materially less evidence than
the statute demands-evidence of gifts driven simply by
Espy's official position .... [T]he terms of the statute re-
quire a finding that the gifts were motivated by more than
merely the giver's desire to ingratiate himself with the offi-
cial generally, or to celebrate the latter's status.
115
At oral argument, the independent counsel's broad reading of
the gratuities statute appeared to have startled the court. When asked
whether an instance in which an old friend of some newly-appointed
officeholder took the latter to a meal or sports event while his firm
had matters pending before the officeholder was an illegal gratuity,
the independent counsel answered that "[ilt may well be."
i 16
113. See Sun-DiamondII, 138 F.3d at 977.
114. See id. at 968.
115. Id. According to counsel for Sun-Diamond, the jury instructions effec-
tively stripped the factfinder of determining whether in fact Sun-Diamond's
gifts were for or because of any official act. See Eric Bloom, Oral Argument
Before the United States Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond I at 32, United States
v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999) (No. 98-131).
116. Sun-DiamondII, 138 F.3d at 967 n.4.
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The court responded by asking the independent counsel if he was se-
rious."
7
In a "somewhat contradictory"' 18 'opinion, however, the appel-
late court also purported to reject the direct nexus approach, instead
trying to find an intermediate ground between the two approaches.
119
According to the court, Sun-Diamond's efforts to win "generalized
sympathy" with Espy would not be actionable as an illegal gratuity,
but a jury could convict the defendant if it found intent to reward
past favorable acts or to make future ones more likely.
120
By failing to endorse either the status approach or the direct
nexus approach, the circuit court decision swung the pendulum to-
ward the middle. Yet the "tenuous distinctions"'121 in the appellate
court opinion left ambiguous the status of the illegal gratuities statute
in the District of Columbia. While the appellate court opinion may
have been legally viable, it, too, was confusing in its practical appli-
cation. The court seemingly failed to realize that, intentionally or
unintentionally, Sun-Diamond's attempts to win generalized sympa-
thy by conferring gifts upon Secretary Espy (legal) would almost un-
doubtedly make future acts more likely (illegal). Again, the case was
appealed to clarify the continuing confusion with the illegal gratui-
ties statute.
3. The Supreme Court decision
In 1998, the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the is-
sue arising under the illegal gratuities statute, even though there were
several other issues in the case. 2 2 "In reviewing the scope of the
gratuities statute, the Supreme Court [would] have to consider where
to land on the continuum of this potentially elastic statute."'
12 3
. Once again, Sun-Diamond argued before the Court, through its
counsel, Eric Bloom, that the statute called for a link between a gift
117. See id.
118. Brown, supra note 18, at 2064.
119. See Sun-Diamond II, 138 F.3d at 969.
120. See Brown, supra note 18, at 2064.
121. Id.
122. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. granted, 525 U.S. 961 (1998).
123. Strauss, Legal Story, supra note 96, at 7.
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on the one hand and some specific official act on the other hand.
124
The government, through Deputy Independent Counsel Robert W.
Ray, argued in response that all that was needed to convict Sun-
Diamond was a showing that Sun-Diamond intended to give gratui-
ties to Secretary Espy because of his official position.
125
The Court immediately took issue with a reading of the statute
that would have criminalized innocent gratuities. Several justices
"battered" the deputy independent counsel with hypotheticals in-
volving different scenarios of trivial gift-giving to public officials.1
26
One commentator noted that "Smaltz [seemed] doomed from the
moment in oral argument when his deputy refused to dismiss the
possibility that baking brownies for a Senator could be subject to
criminal liability under his interpretation of the statute."'
127
In the opinion, the Court appears to have construed the illegal
gratuities statute narrowly for several reasons. First and foremost, it
was concerned with the practical effects-or what the Court called
"peculiar results"--that the government's interpretation would have
produced.128 A broad reading of the gratuities statute would have
criminalized seemingly innocuous gift-giving, including the actions
of a group of farmers who provided a complimentary lunch for the
secretary of agriculture in conjunction with his speech to the farmers
concerning USDA policy. 29 This, in turn, would give aggressive
prosecutors the go-ahead to investigate and prosecute all instances of
gift-giving, without affording lobbyists, gift-givers, and public offi-
cials any protection. Both during oral argument and in the opinion,
the Court expressed concern about interpreting the statute broadly
with "nothing but the Government's discretion" to protect against
unwarranted prosecutions.1
30
124. See Eric Bloom, Oral Argument Before the United States Supreme
Court in Sun-Diamond Iat 32 (No. 98-131).
125. See Robert A. Ray, Oral Argument Before the United States Supreme
Court in Sun-Diamond Iat 3-4 (No. 98-13 1).
126. See Audrey Strauss, The Sun-Diamond Gratuities Ruling by the High
Court, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1999, at 5 [hereinafter Strauss, High Court].
127. Weintraub, supra note 56, at 1.
128. Sun-Diamond I, 119 S. Ct. at 1407.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 1408.
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Second, the Court emphasized the fact that Congress intended
the language of the gratuities statute to pertain to official acts and not
to the office:
Our refusal to read § 201(c)(1)(A) as a prohibition of gifts
given by reason of the donee's office is supported by the
fact that when Congress has wanted to adopt such a broadly
prophylactic criminal prohibition upon gift giving, it has
done so in a more precise and more administrable fash-
ion.
131
Because Congress had distinguished between specific and broad
statutes in the past-as exemplified by the language in 18 U.S.C. §
209(a) prohibiting supplementation of executive salaries-the Court
found any broad interpretation of the gratuities statute to be "implau-
sible."
132
Finally, the Court rejected the government's broad interpretation
of the gratuities statute because it considered a narrow prohibition
"more compatible with the fact that § 201(c)(1)(A) is merely one
strand of an intricate web of regulations ... governing the accep-
tance of gifts and other self-enriching actions by public officials."
133
The Court went on to describe a number of criminal and civil regula-
tions that "demonstrate that this is an area where precisely targeted
prohibitions are commonplace, and where more general prohibitions
have been qualified by numerous exceptions. 134 The Court con-
cluded its analysis by observing that given the linguistic choice, the
statute should be interpreted as a "scalpel" rather than a "meat
axe."
135
In the end, the independent counsel's broad interpretation of the
statute was too extreme to make it tenable. The unanimity of the de-
cision showed that this was not so much a partisan issue as it was a
reflection of the fact that the Court was uncomfortable with expand-
ing the heavily regulated area of gratuities law. While the independ-
ent counsel correctly cited a number of decisions that broadened the
interpretation of the gratuities statute, ultimately, the explicit
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1410.
135. Id.
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language of the gratuities statute requiring the gift to be "for or be-
cause of any official act" supported Sun-Diamond's position, not the
independent counsel's.
136
But while the independent counsel and the district court's use of
the status approach was flawed, the Supreme Court's endorsement of
the direct nexus approach is not much better. The direct nexus ap-
proach does not work because it underestimates just how influential
money is in the legislative process. While the direct nexus approach
prevents "peculiar results" stemming from innocent gift-giving, it
also shelters not-so-innocent gift-giving that is likely to influence a
public official. And like the status approach, the Court's use of the
direct nexus approach as applied to the illegal gratuities statute fails
to draw a line between allowable and unethical conduct, leaving
those distinctions to other regulations. The Court's decision essen-
tially treats the residents of a retirement home who bake brownies for
their senator the same as a company like Sun-Diamond that spends
thousands of dollars to show the public official its gratitude.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF SUN-DIAMOND
While the circuit courts had room to shape § 201(c) as they saw
fit, the Supreme Court's decision in Sun-Diamond left unambiguous
the meaning of the gratuities statute. After this decision, the gov-
ernment would be required to establish a direct nexus between the
gift conferred and an official act performed by the public official.
137
From this decision emerges a clearer picture of who the winners
and the losers are in the battle over illegal gratuities. The decision
was especially cheered by professional lobbyists, who saw increased
opportunities to influence legislation through gift-giving. The deci-
sion will also serve as a helpful precedent for criminal practitioners
to defend against aggressive interpretations of the gratuities
136. Strauss, Legal Story, supra note 96, at 5.
137. The decision
left in place a three-pronged regulatory scheme whereby offering or
accepting a gift as a quid pro quo, to induce an official act, constitutes
bribery... ; offering or accepting a gift as a reward or thank you for
an official act constitutes an illegal gratuity ... ; and offering or ac-
cepting a gift not otherwise prohibited by the criminal laws is subject
to administrative regulation.., but will not result in a jail term.
Weintraub, supra note 56, at 1.
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statute. 38 Yet, one commentator noted that lobbyists and criminal
practitioners should perhaps be more reserved in their jubilation:
The [Sun-Diamond] decision should not . . . give rise to
concern . . . that it is now open season for gift-giving to
federal officials. In fact, such conduct is highly regulated,
as the Court's opinion pointed out, and both criminal and
regulatory sanctions can be imposed on the gift-giver and
recipient in a wide range of circumstances.
139
The decision nevertheless dealt a blow to prosecutors by open-
ing the floodgates to more money in the legislative process. While it
protected innocent gift-giving such as baking brownies for public of-
ficials, the decision also provided legal shelter for corporations and
individuals to wine and dine federal government officials so as to
gain favor with those officials.
Sun-Diamond brings to light a major problem with the illegal
gratuities statute. The statute itself forces courts to apply either the
status approach or the direct nexus approach, when, in fact, neither is
particularly workable. At least one commentator has expressed frus-
tration with a statute that is "so malleable" that it can be read to es-
tablish an offense resembling bribery-as the direct nexus approach
does-and a separate offense based on a different rationale-as the
status approach does.
140
The status approach, on the one hand, creates "peculiar results"
and leaves too much discretion to the government in deciding whom
to prosecute. Samuel J. Buffone, of the American League of Lobby-
ists, astutely observed that a broad reading of the illegal gratuities
statute "in the hands of an aggressive or unethical prosecutor can be
a dangerous weapon."
141
The direct nexus approach, on the other hand, seemingly ignores
the potential influence that a gift could have on the public official in
the official's legislative duties. As one senator noted, "[A]nyone
who believes that corporations and lobbyists lavish a Cabinet secre-
tary with gifts worth tens of thousands of dollars just to be friendly is
138. See Strauss, High Court, supra note 126, at 5.
139. Id.
140. Brown, supra note 18, at 2065.
141. Laurie Asseo, Supreme Court: Bribery Law Needs to Tie Gift with Act,
HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Apr. 28, 1999, at A5.
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dangerously naive.'" 42 While they may not be tied to an official act
when given, these gifts undoubtedly will influence public officials in
their official duties at a later point, thereby benefiting the corpora-
tions or individuals that gave them at the public's expense. And
even if, by chance, the gifts do not influence the public officials,
there is still the public perception that the gifts have played a part in
the officials' decision-making process.
Neither the status approach nor the direct nexus approach really
provide any guidance as to which gifts are legal and which are not.
The only guidance from federal laws on the matter is to be found in
the bribery statute, which makes unlawful any gifts given or received
with the intent to influence an official act,143 or in "an intricate web
of regulations, both administrative and criminal," which governs the
acceptance of gifts and other self-enriching actions by public offi-
cials.144 This raises the twin issues of how to reform § 201(c) to
clarify which gratuities are illegal or whether to do away with it alto-
gether.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the outcome in the Sun-Diamond case, Independent
Counsel Smaltz maintains that his office's "mandate required [it] to
examine both the actions of the regulated companies who gave Espy
gratuities as well as Espy's acceptance of same."'145 Justifying his
investigation, Smaltz stated:
The Espy matter is a case that supports the need for, and
worth of, independent counsel. As Secretary of Agricul-
ture, Michael Espy administered a government department
with a work force of 124,000 employees (6% of the total
number of federal employees), and administered an annual
budget of $65.5 billion (representing 4.3% of the total fed-
eral budget). The ... Secretary of Agriculture is ninth in
line to succeed the President .... But for the appointment
142. Russell D. Feingold, Sound Ethics Haven't Been Ruled Out, L.A.
TIMES, May 4, 1999, at B7.
143. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1995).
144. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 119 S. Ct. 1402, 1408 (1999).
145. Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86
GEO. L.J. 2307, 2376 (1998).
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of an independent counsel, the illegal conduct surrounding
Secretary Espy would never have been exposed, investi-
gated, or prosecuted.
146
Casting aspersions on the value of the independent counsel
aside, one still wonders whether the Espy case was ever worth the
time or expense. After Espy himself had been acquitted, some of
Smaltz's own prosecutors mentioned that the case never should have
been tried. 1
47
Yet, the fault does not lie entirely with Smaltz. Rather, the
problem is with the gratuities statute used to prosecute Espy and
Sun-Diamond, which "was just too ambiguous to hang a conviction
on.' 148 It is clear from the Court's application of the gratuities stat-
ute in Sun-Diamond that, as currently written and interpreted, the
statute lacks real teeth. Section 201(c) now provides wide latitude
for lobbyists to lavish generous gifts upon public officials as long as
they are not connected to an official act.
Rather than dwell on the Sun-Diamond Court's narrow inter-
pretation of the law, many activists have seized the opportunity to
promote badly-needed reform in a defective statute. In other words,
"[w]hile the Espy case turned out to be a lemon, there's still a chance
to make some lemonade out of the Supreme Court's ruling.'
49
There are two ways to approach reform in the area of illegal gratui-
ties: one involves changing or eliminating § 201(c) itself, and the
other involves changing the entire process of gift-giving to public of-
ficials.
A. Changing the Illegal Gratuities Statute Itself
Since the Supreme Court has interpreted the gratuities statute to
require a direct nexus like the bribery statute, one wonders if the
gratuities statute is necessary at all. Yet, simply because both stat-
utes are concerned about the role of money in influencing official
action, there is still a need for two separate offenses with varying de-
grees of punishment. 50  The gratuities offense is meant to cover
146. Id. at 2371-72 (footnote omitted).
147. See Bai, supra note 72, at 34.
148. Feingold, supra note 142, at B7.
149. Id.
150. See Brown, supra note 18, at 2066.
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gift-giving with a more attenuated nexus between the transfer and the
act, the lack of an agreement between donor and donee, and the im-
portance of ethics laws considerations such as avoiding appearances
of impropriety, adopting a prophylactic approach, and downplaying
the importance of motive.
151
Yet, while total elimination of the gratuities statute is probably
unnecessary, the language of the statute could be altered to make the
statute stronger. Perhaps the most important step that Congress
could take to tighten up the gratuities statute is to recognize that
while a strict quid pro quo is not necessary under § 201(c) to convict
the giver or receiver of a gratuity, generous gifts from corporations
and individuals to public officials nevertheless appear improper to
the general public. "Congress should quickly begin work to clarify
and strengthen the statute, to make sure that it covers not just blatant
offers of quid pro quo, but also the appearance of impropriety that
thousands of dollars in gifts to a public official inevitably creates in
the public's mind."
152
The District of Columbia Circuit Court attempted-albeit un-
successfully-to find a middle-ground between the status and direct
nexus approaches. By illegalizing conduct that "make[s] future
[acts] more likely" and "reward[s] or elicit[s] favorable official ac-
tion," the court at least acknowledged that gifts unattached to an offi-
cial act pending before a public official could nonetheless influence
that official, or appear to influence that official, at a later time.
153
Yet, the circuit court clouded its decision with other language mak-
ing it legal to gain "generalized sympathy" from a public official.
154
In searching for new ways to word the statute, Congress should in-
corporate the circuit court decision language about making "future
acts more likely" while leaving out language concerning "general-
ized sympathy."
151. See id.
152. Feingold, supra note 142, at B7.
153. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961, 968-69 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Sun-DiamondII).
154. Id. at 967.
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B. Changing the Gift-Giving Process
In addition to retooling § 201(c), Congress should reduce the
role of money in the legislative process by reforming the gift-giving
process. One way to ensure that money does not find its way into
this political process is to use public funds to finance a public official
to attend events and interact with constituents so constituent compa-
nies will not have to pay the public official's way. This allows pub-
lic officials to interact with their constituents in a manner that is fair
and that appears fair to the public. Under this scheme, companies
such as Sun-Diamond that bestow lavish gifts upon a public official
would no longer be able to defend themselves against charges of
buying influence by saying that they gave the gift to gain "access to"
and "the gratitude of' the public official. Instead, the public official
would appear before such constituents using public funds, thereby
allowing the official to consider pending matters in an impartial
manner that benefits the public rather than a particular individual or
corporation. This tactic may not prove particularly popular, as it
would undoubtedly increase government expenditures necessary to
finance such public events. But in the long run, government funding
may prove to be a better way of allowing public officials to commu-
nicate with their constituents than the current system of lobbying and
influence-peddling.
Yet another potential resolution to this problem-one that is al-
ready in place-is to limit the kinds of gifts that public officials re-
ceive. There are already strict federal regulations preventing federal
employees from accepting gifts from persons or parties who have an
interest in their official work. And Senate gift rules have put limits
on the "fancy vacation trips with lobbyists, lavish meals, and high-
priced tickets to sporting or entertainment events." 155 Any version of
the illegal gratuities statute must be read in conjunction with these
laws to determine when gift-giving becomes excessive and therefore
illegal. Furthermore, these laws should constantly be re-evaluated
and expanded to close gift-giving loopholes. They should also be
narrowly tailored, however, so as not to limit free speech or commu-
nication between government officials and their constituents.
155. Feingold, supra note 142, at B7.
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Another step to combat influence-peddling would be to alter the
federal statutes that cover bribery and gratuities to allow for civil,
rather than criminal, sanctions. At least one thoughtful observer of
the legislative process, attorney and former Federal Election Com-
mittee official Kenneth Gross, has suggested that there are fewer
prosecutions of bribery and illegal gratuities because the relevant
statutes require proof of criminal intent and provide only for criminal
prosecutions with severe penalties.' 56 "Putting someone in prison for
doing favors in exchange for ... contributions ... is arguably dis-
proportionate to the offense. Were such cases to be prosecuted in
civil court instead, the stakes could be lowered considerably while
the primary goal of such prosecutions---deterrence-would be pre-
served.
1 57
Finally, Professor John Hogarth has suggested a number of pre-
ventative measures designed to control corruption before it happens
rather than after the fact. 58 Some of these measures call for the
strengthening of criminal laws to detect and catch corporate wrong-
doers. For instance, Hogarth suggests holding senior managers and
officers of corporations vicariously liable, both civilly and crimi-
nally, for the corrupt acts of their employees, with or without the of-
ficers' guilty knowledge.
159
Other tactics recommended by Hogarth involve reducing the
need and opportunity for corruption and bribery. 160 To reduce the
causes of corruption, "[g]ovemments should target those aspects of
bureaucratic culture that contribute to low morale, neutralization of
156. See Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A
System in Search ofReform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 279, 300 (1991).
157. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 29, at 336; see also United States Su-
preme Court Official Transcript at 13, United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers,
119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999) (No. 98-131) ("[W]hy not, given the difficulties in this
area, assume that Congress intended this general kind of present-giving...
should be handled by civil regulations rather than somebody bringing the blun-
derbuss of the criminal law... into the prosecutor's arsenal, where they could
prosecute trivial things?"); Brown, supra note 18, at 2067 ("Congress should
evaluate whether the offense should be the subject of civil penalties
158. See Hogarth, supra note 21, at 569-75.
159. See id. at 570-71.
160. See id. at 573-75.
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responsibility, and vulnerability to bribes," 161 such as low salaries,
ill-defined tasks, lack of supervision, and excessive delegation of
authority. In a similar vein, corporations and public officials alike
should require full financial disclosure and encourage whistleblow-
ing.
162
The aforementioned policies are only beginning points for
remedying the influence of money on public officials. As is usually
the case, Congress will be reluctant to reform a system that serves its
interests so well. But by both altering the gratuities statute and by
implementing change in the gift-giving process, Congress could take
an active role in reducing illegal gratuities and restoring public trust.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Sun-Diamond decision did not seem to please people
trying to keep money out of the legislative process, it did serve as a
wake-up call to Congress to look once again at seemingly corrupt
practices, and perhaps to reform an outdated and poorly constructed
statute. Congress is now in an unprecedented position to resolve a
problem that has gone unaddressed for several decades. Although
skeptics doubt politicians' propensity and ability to deal with such a
problem, there are indicators-albeit small ones-that politicians are
willing to look at their own actions and that change is forthcoming.
Campaign finance reform packages have been introduced on the
floor of both houses; one has passed in the House of Representatives,
and another was hampered by a Republican filibuster in the Senate.
While "[c]omplete eradication of corruption is an unrealistic
goal[,] [c]ontrolling its spread and limiting its damaging effects can
be achieved given sufficient public demand and political will.
163
With a clearer "conception of what we expect the political system to
accomplish and how we would like government officials and others
in the political process to behave if that system is to have a chance of
success[,]" change is possible in the gratuities statute. 164 If Congress
is able to resolve the problems with the gratuities statute, it can
161. Id. at 573.
162. See id. at 574-75.
163. Id. at 575.
164. Lowenstein, Review, supra note 5, at 1510.
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renew the public's faith that our government's decisions are based on
merits, not money.
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